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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The efficiency problem of Europe’s armed forces is well known: of an impressive overall 
number of over two million men and women in uniform in the EU-27, only a meagre 10 to 
15% are estimated to be deployable. The causes are manifold: the low cost-effectiveness of a 
plethora of small-scale capabilities, unnecessary intra-EU duplications, the presence of large 
numbers  of  quasi  non-deployable  conscripts,  capability  gaps  in  terms  of  ‘enablers’  (in 
particular strategic transport, command, control and communications), and, although all EU 
Member  States  are  conscious  of  the  challenge  and  are  implementing  measures,  slow 
transformation nonetheless from territorial defence to expeditionary warfare. The question 
must be asked whether the existing mechanisms for capability development, in ESDP as well 
as NATO, are sufficient to achieve the required transformation within a reasonable timeframe.  
This article will argue (1) that the primary cause of this problematic state of affairs is the still 
almost exclusively national focus of defence planning, while capability gaps at the aggregate 
EU- and NATO-level are being ignored, and (2) that the only way to achieve the quantum 
leap that is necessary to realise defence transformation is through pooling which, by reducing 
intra-European  duplications,  can  produce  much  more  deployable  capabilities  within  the 
current combined defence budget. From that point of view, it will analyse the potential of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)  to be established by the Lisbon Treaty, and in 
particular  of  Permanent  Structured  Cooperation,
1  the  new  mechanism  for  capability 
development for ‘those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and 
which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the 
most demanding missions’ (Art. 28A §6). One could argue that the solutions to Europe’s 
capability conundrum are in effect well known. The question is whether PermStrucCoop – or 
an analogous mechanism in case the fall-out of the Irish referendum proves deadly for the 
Lisbon Treaty – can be the platform that convinces the Member States to implement them.  
 
Sven BISCOP
2  
 
 
                                                
1 Even in a text as full of jargon as the Treaty on European Union, Permanent Structured Cooperation stands out 
as especially awkward, all the more so as its logical acronym, PSC, already exists, referring to the Political and 
Security Committee. Even though the latter is widely known as COPS, in order to avoid confusion this article 
will opt for Soviet-style abbreviation, hence PermStrucCoop.  
2 Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop is a senior research fellow at Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations in 
Brussels and a visiting professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. The author thanks Brig-Gen. (ret.) Jo 
Coelmont, former Belgian Military Representative to the EUMC, and various Belgian and European academics 
and officials for their indispensable comments and suggestions. The text, including its mistakes, is the full 
responsibility of the author only.  2 
 
2. PERMSTRUCCOOP IN THE LISBON TREATY  
 
The text of the Treaty certainly is ambitious, which underlines the political significance of 
PermStrucCoop as a statement of conviction vis-à-vis ESDP. The preamble to the Protocol 
attached  to  the  Treaty  that  outlines  the  objectives  of  PermStrucCoop and  the  criteria  for 
participation speaks of “a more assertive Union role in security and defence matters” and even 
of “embarking on a new stage in  the  development of the European security  and defence 
policy”.  The  Protocol’s  Article  1  translates  this  into  two  objectives,  one  general,  i.e.  to 
proceed “more intensively” with capability development, and one specific, i.e. to supply (part 
of) a battle group by 2010.  
 
Article 2 then states how these objectives are to be achieved, or in other words what the 
Member States willing to take part in PermStrucCoop should commit to:  
-  To agree on objectives for the level of investment in defence equipment;  
-  To “bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible”, by 
harmonizing military needs, pooling, and, “where appropriate”, specialization;  
-  To  enhance  their  forces’  availability,  interoperability,  flexibility  and  deployability, 
notably by setting “common objectives regarding the commitment of forces”;  
-  To  address  the  shortfalls  identified  by  the  Capability  Development  Mechanism 
(CDM), including through multinational approaches;  
-  To take part, “where appropriate”, in equipment programmes in the context of the 
European Defence Agency (EDA).  
 
The  final  Article  3  states  that  the  EDA  “shall  contribute  to”  a  regular  assessment  of 
participating Member States’ contributions.  
 
From the general nature of the wording of the Protocol and the absence of any figures it is 
evident that the crucial decisions have yet to be made: how to operationalize the commitments 
of Article 2 and translate them into concrete criteria for participation?  
 
One thing is clear though: PermStrucCoop must be inclusive, allowing as many Member 
States  as  possible  to  participate.  This  was  the  consensus  that  emerged  from  the  political 
debate following initial proposals in the European Convention in 2002 for a “defence Euro-
zone”, which had a much more exclusive flavour to them but provoked fears of too deep 
divisions  within  the  EU.
3  Inclusiveness  is  the  right  choice,  for  the  more  Member  States 
participate, the greater the potential for the creation of synergies and effects of scale and thus 
the more added value. The ideal PermStrucCoop is that at 27, to borrow a Belgian general’s 
boutade. An all too exclusive avant-garde of just a few like-minded Member States – if those 
could  be  found  –  could  probably  achieve  deeper  integration  and  would  thus  yield  more 
immediate results, but those would equally probably be obscured by the negative political 
fall-out which it would generate, as it would be likely to widen the intra-EU divide between 
those more and those less in favour of ESDP. Alternatively, PermStrucCoop between France, 
Germany, the UK, Spain, Italy and Poland, as apparently proposed by certain French and, 
earlier, Spanish actors,
4 would not just ignore the potential of the other countries and the 
                                                
3 European Convention, Final Report of Working Group VIII – Defence (CONV 461/02). Brussels, Convention 
Secretariat, 16 December 2002.  
4  Lucia  Kubosova,  “France  to  Push  for  Intervention  Force  Created  by  EU  Big  Six”.  In:  EU  Observer,  15 
February 2008.  3 
 
proportionately large contributions to ESDP operations of many of them,
5 but, by pitting the 
“big  six” against the smaller Member States, would  be very divisive.  Such an  idea  goes 
directly against the spirit of the European project.  
 
The justifiable choice for inclusiveness carries with it a risk though. It must not lead to setting 
the bar for participation so low that it no longer entails any commitment to make additional 
efforts on behalf of the Member States. If one can participate by virtue of one’s existing 
capabilities,  without  having  to  undertake  to  increase  the  number  of  deployable  forces, 
PermStrucCoop serves no purpose. The challenge therefore is to reconcile inclusiveness and 
commitment, to agree on objectives and criteria that allow all Member States to participate, 
each at its own level of means, but that do imply a substantial commitment to make available 
more usable capabilities.  
 
 
                                                
5 See e.g. the group of eight countries that in the period 1995-2007 deployed an above average percentage of 
their forces in every year: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. 
Bastian Giegerich and Alexander Nicoll (eds.), European Military Capabilities – Building Armed Forces for 
Modern Operations. London, IISS, 2008, p. 13.  4 
 
3. OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA: GIVING SUBSTANCE TO THE TREATY  
In the debate on European defence efforts, certain figures are being repeated like a mantra, 
e.g. the idea that every State should spend 2% of GDP on defence. Such proposals, which are 
now also being mentioned in the context of fleshing out PermStrucCoop, seem to ignore the 
basic political and budgetary context in Europe. A closer look immediately makes clear that 
such general budgetary criteria are either evidently unfeasible or by themselves cannot be 
expected to yield substantial results in terms of accelerated transformation. Setting a defence 
budget of 2% GDP as threshold for participation will lead to PermStrucCoop between just 
France, the UK, Greece and Bulgaria.
6 For countries like Austria, Belgium and Germany, this 
amounts to almost a doubling of the defence budget – which will not happen. Alternatively, 
achieving a sound balance between personnel costs, operational costs and investments within 
the defence budget – like the often cited 50-25-25 division – is very laudable, but has been a 
goal of many Member States for a long time and has not proved to be easily achievable, nor 
has it directly generated additional capabilities. Limited defence budgets and the need for a 
socially acceptable solution to personnel issues mean that only a very slow evolution towards 
the “ideal” balance – if that überhaupt exists – is possible.  
 
In the same vein, criteria applied to the whole of participating States’ armed forces appear to 
have  limited  potential  for  achieving  concrete  results  within  a  reasonable  timeframe.  The 
objective of 40% deployability and 8% sustainability, i.e. 40% of the armed forces have to be 
deployable and one fifth of those or 8% of the total must be deployed at any one time, seems 
equally laudable but has been cited for years, notably with regard to land forces, without 
triggering substantial improvements. In fact in 2007 of all EU Member States only Ireland and 
the UK deployed 8% or more of their forces; the EU average stood only at about 3.7% and 18 
Member States deployed less than 4% of their forces.
7 The means for a quantum leap in the 
whole of the armed forces at once are simply not available in any Member State.  
 
For the same reason, it does not seem realistic to demand Member States to fulfil all criteria at 
the moment of entry into PermStrucCoop. The comparison with monetary union can illustrate 
this: if all convergence criteria would have had to be fulfilled at the moment of entry, many 
current long-standing members of the Eurozone would still not have been able to join the 
single currency.  
 
Quantifiable and verifiable criteria are of course necessary for PermStrucCoop to work. But 
criteria must also be achievable by a majority of Member States, as PermStrucCoop must be 
inclusive,  and  must  have  the  potential  to  accelerate  transformation  and  produce  tangible 
results, i.e. additional deployable capabilities, in the medium term. Therefore, although the 
more general criteria of the type described above can still be useful as long-term points of 
reference, in the more immediate future:  
-  PermStrucCoop must be aimed at specific and concrete capability objectives.  
-  Criteria  must  then  apply  to  these  specific  capabilities  for  which  Member  States 
undertake commitments in the framework of PermStrucCoop, rather than to the total 
of their armed forces or defence budgets.  
-  These commitments must be results-oriented, to be realized by an agreed deadline.  
 
                                                
6 Giegerich and Nicoll (eds.), op.cit., p. 94.  
7 Giegerich and Nicoll (eds.), op.cit., p. 15. 5 
 
First  and  foremost  therefore,  the  objectives  must  be  defined:  which  precise  qualitative 
objectives is PermStrucCoop to achieve? This must not be answered in terms of input – what 
is each Member State offering to contribute, i.e. without further ado replicating the bottom-up 
approach of the Headline Goal process, which would simply result in another catalogue of 
theoretically available, non-identified forces. The answer must be output-driven, i.e. which 
tasks do the Member States want to be able to do together, how do they want to be able to do 
these, and which sum total of capabilities is needed to that end? The EDA, which is given an 
important role in the Protocol, can provide this task-oriented basis on which each Member 
State can found the definition of its objectives in joining PermStrucCoop. Of course, these 
objectives will also be determined by which capabilities are already available, and by how 
many additional capabilities can realistically be expected. But in which areas the additional 
capabilities are to be created should be driven by the EDA-identified priorities on the basis of 
which tasks to be performed and how. Once these objectives are agreed, criteria and deadlines 
can be developed to be applied to these specific targets.  
The end-result should be that in an agreed number of years and thus at a quicker pace than at 
present, in certain agreed fields, more deployable capabilities are available then today. This 
should enable the EU to implement its military tasks at a higher level then today in terms of 
scale and numbers of operations, and to do so more effectively and efficiently. The aim is not 
that PermStrucCoop as a whole would constitute one single – e.g. corps-sized – force package 
that can be deployed as such. It is a framework, a tool, for capability development, not for 
operations – but one may reasonably expect those who participate to show more willingness 
to participate in operations. 
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4. CONTRIBUTING TO PERMSTRUCCOOP  
In order to establish the output to which the objectives of PermStrucCoop must be geared one 
can first look at the Lisbon Treaty itself, which in Article 28B §1 extends, or perhaps better 
said, defines in more detail the Petersberg Tasks: basically all military operations, across the 
full spectrum – including ‘the most demanding missions’, as mentioned in the Protocol – 
except for collective  territorial defence. Within that framework, the broadest guidance, at 
horizon 2025, is provided by the EDA’s Long-Term Vision, which for six broad capability 
domains  –  command,  inform,  engage,  protect,  deploy  and  sustain  –  prescribes  the 
characteristics of future capabilities: synergy, agility, selectivity and sustainability.  
Different options for participation then present themselves. These are not  exclusive:  each 
Member State can select one or more of these:  
-  Option 1: The most immediate capability objective is to close the remaining shortfalls 
in the various specific capability areas required to fulfil the Headline Goal (HG) 2010, 
as  listed  in  the  Progress  Catalogue.  The  lowest  threshold  for  a  Member  State  to 
participate in PermStrucCoop would thus be the willingness to contribute to that aim 
in one or more of those specific capability areas.  
-  Option 2: More broadly, participating Member States could also undertake to increase 
the  deployability  of  existing  force  packages  (e.g.  mechanized  or  light  infantry 
brigades, helicopter units) that cut across a range of capability areas. Today there exist 
many formations, often large-scale, that are not deployable and hence do not constitute 
a capability. The aim need not necessarily be to create more stand-by forces – almost 
all Member States already fulfil the second objective of PermStrucCoop, i.e. taking 
part in a battle group, while the difficulty of the NATO Response Force (NRF) to 
achieve its desired strength of 21,000 shows that in the current state of European 
capabilities, too large stand-by forces that are exclusively tied to one organization and 
cannot be deployed in other frameworks limit rather than enhance Europe’s ability to 
do operations.  
-  Option 3: More broadly still and existing force structures and capabilities set aside, 
Member States could adopt a more prospective approach and start planning for future 
capabilities in new areas in which the EU is not yet active.  
 
Of major importance in all three options is the guidance provide by the EDA, in order to 
ensure that commitments are anchored in the EU framework, i.e. are focused on the capability 
shortfalls at the aggregate EU-level that are relevant for the EU’s military tasks, rather than 
being based on national considerations only without reference to combined needs, as happens 
all too often still.
8 In this regard the new Capability Development Plan (CDP) elaborated by 
the EDA and endorsed by the Member States on 8 July 2008 is important. The four strands of 
the CDP are to provide the framework for planning at the national level, to function as a “plan 
for  planning”:  the  Headline  Goal  2010,  i.e.  existing  capability  objectives  in  the  short  to 
medium term; the technology trends, informing Member States which capabilities might be 
possible in the longer term; lessons learnt from operations in various frameworks (ESDP, 
NATO etc.); and a database of Member States’ current longer term plans and programmes, 
which notably allows the EDA to identify opportunities for cooperation. At the same time as 
                                                
8  Many  capability  decisions  are notably  motivated  by  a  desire  to  protect  national  industries  or  to  preserve 
prestige, resulting in investments in areas where at the EU level there is no need or even a surplus, e.g. frigates.  7 
 
endorsing the overall approach of the CDP, Member States also selected twelve topics for 
specific action,
9 which can usefully inform PermStrucCoop.  
 
As Member States express their interests, the EDA will gain a picture of the capability areas 
in which initiatives will be taken. The resulting combination of initiatives, to be realized by an 
agreed deadline (which can vary in function of the capability field), would de facto constitute 
a successor Headline Goal to the soon to expire HG2010.  
 
Criteria can then be developed that apply to each planned contribution, regardless of its size, 
allowing each Member State to contribute at its own level of means. Such specific criteria are 
much more achievable than general criteria applying to participating Member States’ armed 
forces or defence budgets as a whole. Relevant criteria per contribution could include:  
-  Deployability and sustainability targets (which can vary in function of the capability 
field): if not the whole of Member States’ armed forces, at least the new initiatives, 
geared to the identified shortfalls, should lead to effectively available capabilities.  
-  Interoperability: all new initiatives should be geared to combined, i.e. multinational, 
operations from the start.
10  
-  A level of investment in defence equipment, as mentioned in the Protocol, but per 
capita (where applicable, e.g. with regard to a brigade).  
 
In addition and also referring to the Protocol, one criterion of a more general nature could be 
useful, i.e. a minimal participation in EDA equipment programmes. Member States ought not 
to take part in every project, but a minimal financial contribution, based on GDP, could be 
fixed.  Member  States  could  retain  the freedom  to  choose  the  programmes  in  which they 
participate, but once allocated, the money should be managed by the EDA.  
 
Although PermStrucCoop as such is not an operational framework, participating Member 
States can be encouraged to contribute to operations, which is of course the ultimate aim. 
Wouters
11 details how a link can be made between force generation for specific operations 
and capability development by introducing extensive common funding for ESDP operations 
instead of “costs lie where they fall”. Member States would contribute to common funding in 
function of GDP, but deploying capabilities for an operation would count as a contribution in 
kind, to be deducted from the normal contribution to common funding, according to fixed 
rates  per  man  day,  flying  hour  and  sailing  day,  which  can  be  modulated  in  function  of 
mission-specific  conditions,  such  as  risk  to  troops  and  wear  and  tear  of  equipment.  The 
condition would be that the capabilities contributed would answer to the Combined Joint 
Statement of Requirements for the operation (CJSOR), i.e. that they would fulfil an actual 
military  need  rather  than  an  unsolicited  type  of  contribution.  Thus  at  the  same  time  the 
impression of paying twice (once under “costs lie where they fall” and once under the existing 
                                                
9 Counter man-portable air defence systems (MANPADs); computer network operations; mine counter-measures 
in  littoral  sea  areas;  military  implications  of  the  comprehensive  approach;  human  intelligence;  intelligence, 
surveillance,  target  acquisition  and  reconnaissance  (ISTAR);  medical  support;  CBRN  defence;  third  party 
logistic support; counter-improvised explosive device (IED); helicopters; network-enabled capability (NEC).  
10 Member States have agreed to not develop interoperability standards in the ESDP framework, but to apply 
NATO STANAGS.  
11 Patrick Wouters, Balancing Defence and Security Efforts with a Permanently Structured Scorecard. Egmont 
Paper 23. Brussels, Egmont, 2008, www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep23.pdf.   8 
 
Athena-mechanism) would be avoided and Member States would be encouraged to invest in 
the “right” capabilities. Perhaps in addition sustainability could also be a general criterion for 
participation in PermStrucCoop, but then a much more realistic target must be set than the 
usually mentioned 8%, e.g. between 4 and 5%.
12  
 
Setting criteria only makes sense if capabilities are pre-identified, for otherwise no effective 
evaluation by the EDA as foreseen in the Protocol is possible. PermStrucCoop can build on 
the experience of the battle groups, which introduced the notion of pre-identified units in 
ESDP. Setting criteria applying to the specific pre-identified contributions of each Member 
State will bring real added value as compared to the existing “catalogue system” of ESDP. 
This evaluation must be real indeed, for the Treaty foresees that participating Member States 
that no longer fulfil the criteria can be excluded. One further criterion for participation in 
PermStrucCoop could thus also simply be the obligation to inform and show full transparency 
towards the EDA.
13 In addition, on a voluntary basis, participating Member States could also 
agree to exercises and “tactical evaluation” of their capabilities, which would enhance the 
quality of the assessment and could lead to a process of certification. This task could be 
performed by the EUMS together with Member State representatives.  
 
Even though these objectives and criteria do not cover the whole of Member States’ armed 
forces and defence budgets, they are achievable within the existing political and budgetary 
context, which is one of, at best, stable, but certainly not increasing defence budgets. In the 
medium to long term, through a process of rationalisation, cutting of redundant capabilities 
and prioritizing of usable capabilities, focussing on these objectives and criteria will affect the 
complete defence effort of the participating States.  
 
 
                                                
12 Naturally all deployments count towards this target, not only those in the context of ESDP operations. The 
common funding mechanism could also be applied to NATO operations, as Wouters advocates.  
13 Bruno Angelet and Ioannis Vrailas, European Defence in the Wake of the Lisbon Treaty. Egmont Paper 21. 
Brussels, Egmont, 2008, p. 43, www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep.21.pdf.  9 
 
5. CONTRIBUTING THROUGH POOLING  
 
Regardless of which option(s) Member States select to contribute to PermStrucCoop, they can 
choose  to  contribute  on  an  entirely  national  basis,  by  improving  and  creating  national 
capabilities,  but  they  can  also  opt  for  cooperation  and  pooling  of  assets  with  other 
participating Member States in order to create multinational capabilities.  
 
One of the main causes of the low deployability of Europe’s armed forces is that national 
thinking still dominates defence planning: most Member States aim to maintain a wide range 
of nationally organized capabilities in army, navy and air force, and take little or no account 
of EU – or, for that matter, NATO – guidelines in their national decision-making process. But 
because in most Member States the scale of the armed forces and the size of the defence 
budget are limited, this leads to what Pilegaard has tellingly dubbed ‘mini-mass armies’:
14 
Member  States  maintain  the  structures  of  their  larger  Cold  War-time  armed  forces,  but 
without the numbers below those structures to actually make up all the units. The overall 
result  is  one  of  fragmentation,  duplication  and  very  low  cost-effectiveness.  Only  limited 
quantities of each capability can be maintained, but each small-scale deployable capability 
needs supporting services and many of the overhead costs are fixed: whether a Member State 
operates 1 or  100 tanks or  fighters  – in  both cases a base is needed, personnel must be 
recruited  and  trained,  supplies  bought,  and  the  paperwork  done…  If  only  10  to  15%  of 
Member States’ armed forces are deployable, it is because with these small-scale capabilities 
they cannot man a full rotation cycle if full units (battalions, squadrons) are deployed and will 
thus be out of the loop for a longer time after every deployment, or alternatively they can only 
sustain sub-units in very limited numbers for longer periods. Too large a share of personnel is 
devoted to overhead and supporting services that are unnecessarily duplicated within the EU – 
the true duplication debate. The budgets that are absorbed by those unnecessary duplications 
cannot  be  spent  on  the  ongoing  transformation  from  territorial  defence  to  expeditionary 
warfare, which requires investment in equipment, recruitment, and training and manoeuvres – 
needs that are reflected in the capability shortfalls.  
 
Pooling of assets, which is included in the Protocol on PermStrucCoop, appears the only way 
to  overcome  this  problem  of  fragmentation  and  should  therefore  be  actively  stimulated. 
PermStrucCoop could function as a forum – a marriage agency – identifying opportunities for 
cooperation between Member States once they have declared their intention to contribute in 
one or more areas, through one or more of the options described in the previous paragraph. 
Such cooperation can take different forms, from (i) joint procurement projects in order to 
equip national formations, to (ii) the creation of pooled multinational formations, and (iii) 
joint R&T projects. Maximum effect will be created by pooling, i.e. effective integration: an 
“end-to-end” process leading from joint procurement to common logistics, training, doctrine 
etc.
15  Obviously,  pooling  cannot  be  but  voluntary.  Furthermore,  not  all  Member  States 
participating in PermStrucCoop must cooperate in all fields: if Member States A, B, C and D 
find they share an interest in capability area X and establish a form of cooperation (i), at the 
                                                
14 Jess Pilegaard, ‘The European Security and Defence Policy and the Development of a Security Strategy for 
Europe’.  In:  Jess  Pilegaard  (ed.),  The  Politics  of  European  Security.  Copenhagen,  Danish  Institute  of 
International Studies, 2004, pp. 11-38.  
15 Pierre Hougardy, “Permanent Structured Cooperation”. In: Sven Biscop and Franco Algieri (eds.), The Lisbon 
Treaty  and  ESDP:  Transformation  and  Integration.  Egmont  Paper  24.  Brussels,  Egmont,  2008,  p.  12, 
www.egmontinstitute.be/paperegm/ep24.pdf.  10 
 
same time Member States C, D, E and F can have a shared interest in area Y and cooperate in 
the form of (i), (ii) or (iii). A number of overlapping clusters would thus emerge, with the 
EDA  responsible  for  maintaining  the  overview  and  evaluating  contributions.  The  fourth 
strand  of  the  CDP,  the  database  of  Member  States’  plans  and  programmes,  will  be  of 
particular importance in this regard.  
 
In many areas, cooperation, including pooling, does not have to start from scratch but can be 
based on existing initiatives that can be widened and deepened. The least sensitive field is 
probably that of training, where many countries already cooperate, e.g. France and Belgium 
for the training of pilots; additional synergies should be easy to find. In the field of logistics 
and support, many initiatives exist as well, but more can be done. An interesting model is 
provided  by  the  creation  of  the  European  Air  Transport  Command  (EATC)  by  Belgium, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands, which will assume effective command over a certain 
share of the new A400M transport aircraft of the participating countries. This example of 
pooling could be both deepened, by gradually transferring a larger share of national capability 
to EATC as well as by integrating further fields such as maintenance etc., and widened, by 
inviting additional countries to participate. In February 2008 the EDA Steering Board notably 
decided to set up a project team to investigate how to develop a “European Air Transport 
Fleet”  through  pooled  ownership  of  the  A400M  that  several  more  Member  States  are 
acquiring.
16  
 
Fighter aircraft are the next logical field for cooperation: one can imagine that Member States 
that  are  struggling  to  preserve  a  capability  in  this  area  –  an  objective  which  in  itself  is 
justifiable – could more easily remain active in this field, and like Belgium e.g. could in the 
future replace their current aircraft, if they pool their efforts to build one multinational fighter 
force. Each participating country can contribute (a number of) “national” squadrons, but the 
unit as a whole is supported by single integrated logistics, maintenance etc. If the actual 
combat units thus remain national – and there is no need for multinationalization below the 
squadron or battalion level – synergies can still be found by anchoring these in a multinational 
structure  –  wing  or  brigade  –  with  single  multinational  support  and  logistics  behind  it, 
creating substantial synergies and effects of scale, as well as integrated command & control 
arrangements. The World War II RAF can serve to illustrate this model: it counted Belgian, 
Czech, Dutch, Polish squadrons – but obviously there was no separate Belgian logistic tail or 
Czech maintenance... This model can apply to the army as well. The objective of achieving 
full deployability of a Belgian brigade e.g. can be more easily achieved if that brigade is more 
fully  anchored  in  the  Eurocorps,  and  the  Belgian  support  structures are  merged  into  one 
Eurocorps structure.  
 
Such  formats  link  back  to  some  of  the  more  constructive  Convention  proposals,  which 
mentioned  “participation  in  multinational  forces  with  integrated  command  and  control 
capabilities” as a possible focus for PermStrucCoop. An added advantage of contributing to 
PermStrucCoop  not  simply  with  pre-identified  assets,  but  by  pooling  those,  is  that  force 
packages can be created which include pre-identified arrangements and options for command 
& control – see e.g. the current debate on the role of the Eurocorps’ FHQ – and for strategic 
transport. In a way, such forms of pooling are a continuation of the battle groups, a major 
experiment in military integration, but now at a larger scale. The battle groups actually predict 
the  pattern  of  the  clusters  that  are  likely  to  emerge,  for  in  the  battle  groups  the  “usual 
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suspects”, those that have a tradition of working together, have already found each other – 
witness the battle group based on the framework nations that also constitute the Eurocorps. As 
the  examples  above  show,  the  potentially  most  advantageous  opportunities  arise  when 
Member  States  operate or  acquire  the  same  equipment.  Perhaps  this means  that  Member 
States, especially the smaller ones, when deciding on future investments, should take into 
account the choice of whom they want to cooperate with as a major factor in procurement 
decisions.  
 
Pooling can actually increase Member States’ sovereignty. Today, many Member States on 
their own are no longer capable of mounting  a sizable operation  of some duration – the 
sovereignty that some cling to is largely illusory. Through pooling however, the efficiency of 
the national defence budgets can be substantially enhanced, i.e. in term pooling will generate 
more  deployable  capabilities  within  the  same  budget,  and  will  allow  Member  States  to 
continue to remain active in a broader range of capability fields, but each at its own level of 
means. Furthermore, it allows them to operate at levels, e.g. the corps, which are beyond the 
scope  of  their  national  armed  forces.  As  essentially  command  &  control  and  support  & 
logistics would be merged while the frontline battalions and squadrons would each still be 
composed of one nationality, there would be sufficient flexibility to allow Member States not 
to commit frontline capabilities to every operation in which the multinational formation takes 
part;  e.g.  an  integrated  FHQ  can  still  run  national  operations,  as  is  the  case  in  Admiral 
Benelux,  the  far-reaching  integration  of  the  Dutch  and  Belgian  navies.  Vice  versa  the 
possibility  of  contributing  only  through  the  multinational command  &  control  or  support 
structures would make it easier for Member States to support more operations. Operations 
would be much more efficient, for the logistical tail would be much less fragmented.
17 It is 
important  indeed  that  the  multinational  formations  created  through  pooling  are  also  the 
framework for deployment, unlike the existing multinational units, most of which have rarely 
if ever been deployed as such.
18 
 
As  pooling  gradually  progresses,  certain  national  structures  in  the  field  of  support  and 
command & control will be abolished in order to be merged into multinational structures, thus 
deepening integration as compared to most existing multinational formations, such as the 
Eurocorps today, which apart from small permanent elements – in the case of the Eurocorps, 
the FHQ and its support battalion – are a catalogue of forces without too many links between 
them, just as much as ESDP as a whole. If joining a multinational formation means nothing 
more than a new shoulder patch, no synergies and effects of scale and thus no added value 
will be created. In term, this process may lead to co-location of certain structures, going 
beyond HQs, on a reduced number of bases, entailing that for the Eurocorps e.g. a share of 
Belgian, Spanish and Luxembourg personnel hitherto based in their own countries might find 
themselves serving in bases in France or Germany; similarly a multinational fighter formation 
would ideally be based on one airbase. However, as many Member States, including Belgium, 
have had a very large share of their forces serving abroad, notably in Germany, for several 
decades, that ought not to pose a problem, provided at least that staff are offered interesting 
conditions.  
                                                
17 Whereas for the current ESDP operation in Chad e.g. in various national contingents the troops dealing with 
logistics outnumber by far the forces actually on the ground.  
18 Even the Eurocorps e.g. has only seen its FHQ deployed, to Afghanistan and Kosovo, and has never been the 
framework for the deployment of actual combat units.  12 
 
6. AN EU-NATO–NEUTRAL PROJECT  
 
PermStrucCoop is about creating more deployable capabilities in Europe, an objective that 
benefits both ESDP and NATO, as well as the UN, for even if they are generated through 
pooling, all of these capabilities can be deployed in all of these frameworks. Vice versa, 
capabilities generated in the NATO framework should also benefit European deployment in 
an ESDP or UN context, e.g. the initiative by seventeen NATO members and partners to 
purchase four Boeing C17 transport aircraft in order to create a Strategic Airlift Capability 
(SAC).  In that sense, PermStrucCoop is basically neutral  vis-à-vis the eternal EU-NATO 
debate.  
 
That does not mean however that it will not have any effect on the relationship between the 
two. Currently, coordination on capability development between the EU and NATO is very 
limited, because of political blockages at the highest level. It is often said that this lack of 
coordination is less problematic than it seems, because as they identify the same capability 
gaps, the EU and NATO obviously come up with very similar guidelines. More realistically 
perhaps it could be said that it is not problematic simply because Member States largely 
ignore both NATO and EU guidelines anyway... Until now, the actual impact of either on 
national defence planning is marginal, and even when – limited – additional capabilities are 
generated it is difficult to determine to which extent that is a result of EU and/or NATO 
initiatives  –  Member  States  often  pledge  what was  already  foreseen  in  national  planning 
anyway. PermStrucCoop has the potential to change that, because of the opportunity to set 
self-defined but concrete and verifiable objectives and to foster cooperation and pooling, and 
that within the Treaty, thus allowing the active involvement of EU institutions such as the 
EDA and, more generally, embedding defence in the overall political project of the EU. If 
PermStrucCoop succeeds in realizing that potential, it will have an important and gradually 
increasing impact on national decisions. The question then is: where does that leave NATO 
defence planning? The NATO system is in fact undergoing a review, which will probably 
result in more focus on priority shortfalls and multinational programmes. As at the same time 
through  PermStrucCoop  the  EU  is  evolving  towards  more  concrete  targets  and  real 
assessment  of  contributions,  the  two  mechanisms  appear  to  be  converging.
19  A 
reconfiguration of defence planning seems in order.  
 
This development need not be seen as a zero-sum game between NATO and the EU. It would 
rather  signal  the  gradual  evolution,  already  underway,  towards  a  “two-pillar”  NATO, 
composed of two pillars: the US and the EU. These are the two fully-fledged actors, both 
addressing the whole of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military, and 
both building capabilities in all of those areas, which sometimes they will put to use jointly 
and sometimes not. The decision-making on Lebanon can serve to illustrate the trend. The UN 
having  asked  a  European  contribution  to  peacekeeping  after  the  2006 war,  the  European 
countries debated this, and decided to act – this decision was taken in the EU, increasingly the 
political centre of gravity. Following that political decision, in a second step, the framework 
in which to implement it was chosen – NATO, ESDP or the UN. This cannot be but an ad hoc 
decision, in function of what is most suited to the case at hand – in the case of Lebanon, to 
send blue helmets. In view of this  trend, and given the  problem of the fragmentation of 
Europe’s  defence  effort  and  the  potential  offered  by  cooperation  and  integration  among 
Europeans, it would seem logical that EU Member States would increasingly build an ever 
                                                
19 Heinrich Brauss, “The Future of Defence Planning – A NATO Perspective”. In: Biscop and Algieri, op.cit., 
pp. 33-41.  13 
 
more coordinated defence capacity in the ESDP context, which in those cases where the EU 
and the US decide to act jointly serves as the European military pillar within NATO.  
 
In such a scenario, the US would lose a degree of influence, for it would be natural for an 
increasingly capable Europe to expect an increased say in decision-making – eventually one 
could even imagine the EU speaking with one voice in NATO. But the US would gain a much 
more capable partner with whom real burden-sharing, a long-standing US demand, would be 
possible –  be it that the US should not expect  European Allies to  deploy  their forces in 
function  of  just  any  US  policy.  Recent  declarations  by  Victoria  Nuland,  US  Permanent 
Representative  to  NATO,  appear  to  indicate  that  US  thinking  might  be  shifting  in  this 
direction.
20 Pointing to the need for “a Europe that is as united as possible, ready and willing 
to bear its full measure of responsibility for defending our common security”, Ambassador 
Nuland called for “a stronger, more capable European defence capacity”, for “an ESDP with 
only soft power is not enough” – adding that “coalitions of the willing have their limitations”. 
Less strongly worded, the same spirit can also be found in the declaration issued by NATO’s 
Bucharest  Summit  (2-4  April  2008).  If  this  is  the  course  to  be  followed,  the  best  a  US 
administration could do is simply to tell the more Atlantic-oriented European countries not to 
worry about the impact on NATO or on their relationship with Washington, not to think in 
terms  of  a  zero-sum  game,  but  to  go  ahead  and  participate  fully  in  enhancing  European 
capabilities  through  ESDP,  for  the  US  to  afterwards  have  a  real  partner.  As  these  US 
declarations coincided with the announcement by France of its intention to reintegrate the 
NATO military structure, a very important symbolic gesture, it seems that the ball now lies in 
the camp of the UK as the leading Atlanticist country in Europe...  
 
 
                                                
20 Victoria Nuland, Speech at the London School of Economics, 25 February 2008. The Ambassador gave a 
similar speech at the Press Club in Paris on 22 February.  14 
 
7. LOOKING FORWARD: AN EU MILITARY STRATEGY?  
 
Much more important than whether a specific operation will be undertaken under ESDP, 
NATO or the UN – that will always be an ad hoc decision – is the overall question of the 
EU’s  military  level  of  ambition.  The  2003  European  Security  Strategy  (ESS)  is  very 
ambitious: “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security”. But 
what does that responsibility entail, in concrete terms? What do the 27 EU Member States as a 
whole want to be able to do in terms of crisis management and peace support operations, 
whether they are called Petersberg Tasks or Non-Article 5 Operations? There is a clear lack of 
vision and a lack of coordination between targets set in the different organizations.  
 
In principle, the scale of the ambition for ESDP operations is defined in the 1999 Headline 
Goal: to project and sustain for a year 60,000 troops. On this number are based the five 
illustrative  scenarios
21  on  the  basis  of  which  the  EUMS  does  generic  planning  for  the 
ambition  of  simultaneously  undertaking  two  to  three  peacekeeping  or  peace  enforcement 
operations of significant duration, plus a number of smaller civilian operations. Requiring of 
course three times as many front-line troops, in view of rotation, plus the various support 
services, this is an ambitious objective, because it means 60,000 troops for ESDP, in addition 
to NATO, UN and national expeditionary operations, and in addition to collective territorial 
defence.  Although declared operational, with  certain  limitations, by the Laeken  European 
Council (December 2001), it now often appears as if this objective has been forgotten, being 
overshadowed  by the much more limited battle group project. In any case as, the battle 
groups set aside, Member States have not committed pre-identified capabilities, the effective 
availability of the 60,000 is impossible to assess, all the more so as most Member States at the 
same time have declared the same numbers to NATO, which has of course its own level of 
ambition,  including  the  21,000  NRF.  If  all  ongoing  ESDP,  NATO,  UN  and  national 
operations in which EU Member States participate are counted, Europe today deploys more 
than 70,000 troops, but EU Member States can obviously not mobilize 60,000 additional 
troops. It is equally obvious however that even the combined ESDP and NATO level of 
ambition still falls far short of the total combined armed forces of the EU-27: 2 million troops, 
on which there is no grand vision, even if collective defence is taken into account. Even less 
clear than the scale is the geographical and functional focus of the EU’s ambition: what, if 
any, are the priorities for intervention, e.g. the Responsibility to Protect?  
 
This  missing  link  between  the  overall  political  objectives  of  the  ESS  and  capability 
development means that even if today a task- or output-oriented approach to PermStrucCoop 
is adopted, it is to some extent taking place in a void. What is required is a unified vision on 
the level of ambition, cutting across organizational divides: whether they act through ESDP, 
NATO or the UN, how many forces should the EU-27 as a whole be able to muster for crisis 
management as well as for long-term peacekeeping, for which priorities, which reserves does 
this require, and which capacity must be maintained for territorial defence? In all probability 
the result will be that Europe does not need 2 million uniforms...  
 
                                                
21 Conflict prevention, separation of parties by force, stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third 
countries, evacuation operations and assistance to humanitarian operations.  15 
 
The new French defence white book,
22 published in June 2008 on the eve of France’s EU 
Presidency, opened this debate, pleading for a European white book on defence and security 
and  re-emphasizing  the  “60,000”  objective;  it  also  indicates  the  geographical  focus  of 
France’s efforts, from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. Advantage should be taken of 
the ongoing debate on the ESS to further the issue. The High Representative, Javier Solana, 
was tasked by the December 2007 European Council ‘to examine the implementation of the 
Strategy with a view to proposing elements on how to improve the implementation and, as 
appropriate, elements to complement it’, by December 2008. A useful outcome would be a 
new tasking by the European Council, to draft a white book for the EU, i.e. a military – or 
perhaps better, civil-military – sub-strategy to the ESS. That would constitute a much more 
concrete framework within which the CDP can guide Member States’ efforts, be they national 
or multinational. The EU would indeed be the right context to develop such a vision, which 
afterwards should inform the debate about a new strategic concept for NATO, due to be 
launched at the Alliance’s Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in 2009.  
 
 
                                                
22  Défense  et  Sécurité  Nationale.  Le  Livre  Blanc.  Paris,  Odile  Jacob  /  La  Documentation  Française,  2008, 
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8. CONCLUSION   
 
PermStrucCoop  can  be  a  very  flexible  instrument,  allowing  all  EU  Member  States  to 
participate, if they so choose, at their own level of means, in the way that they choose:  
-  Member States wanting to take part can declare which contribution, of which size, in 
which timeframe they are considering: in which specific capability areas, and/or with 
which force packages, and/or with regard to which longer-term, future capabilities.   
-  Simultaneously, the participating Member States, with the support of the EDA, can 
agree on criteria that apply to each specific contribution, regardless of size, in terms of 
deployability, sustainability, interoperability and per capita investment in equipment, 
in addition to a minimum level for participation in EDA programmes and, perhaps, 
operations.  
-  The EDA can then assess the opportunities for different forms of cooperation and 
pooling in function of Member States’ declared intentions, allowing Member States to 
decide  which  contributions  they  will  offer  on  a  national  basis  and  which  in 
cooperation, in which format, with other Member States.  
-  This  will  result  in  a  set  of  concrete  capability  objectives,  to  be  achieved  by  pre-
identified units, some national, some multinational, in an agreed timeframe.  
-  The EDA is responsible for monitoring progress and assessing contributions against 
the  agreed  criteria  and  the  evolving  needs,  as  well  as  continuously  updating  and 
proposing opportunities for cooperation, in function of the CDP.  
 
PermStrucCoop is not the silver bullet that will solve all problems of Europe’s military. But 
because it is in the Treaty and Member States therefore have to consider whether and how to 
make use of it, it presents a window of opportunity to further ESDP. If a critical mass of 
Member States willing to go ahead with PermStrucCoop can be found, the desire to “be in” 
will probably lead many others to participate. Once in, peer pressure and the need to avoid 
exclusion for no longer fulfilling the criteria should stimulate Member States’ efforts. The 
only “carrot” that can stimulate Member States to set demanding criteria in the first place 
however is the one that should appeal to Finance Ministers: the potential of increasing the 
efficiency of the defence budget, of realizing a significant and visible output. Whether this 
constitutes a sufficient incentive remains to be seen.
23 
 
Because it mostly is a window of opportunity, the same advances can actually also be realized 
without  the  specific  mechanism  of  PermStrucCoop  in  the  Lisbon  Treaty.  Member  States 
could launch a similarly permanent and structured process, with a central role for the EDA, 
through  a  Capability  Commitment  Conference.
24  What  is  required  is  a  critical  mass  of 
Member States willing to take things forward. This critical mass must however include the 
“big three”, for maximal gains are only possible if their capabilities are part of the process – 
closer cooperation between the smaller Member States only has its limits. France and the UK 
often – rightfully – reproach the others for not doing enough, but they should not block the 
solution that would exactly allow all Member States to make a useful contribution. Germany 
is in a different position: in the area of defence, it is one of the “big three” only in terms of 
numbers,  but  not  in  qualitative  terms  –  the  deployability  of  its  forces  is  very  limited;  it 
therefore is the country that has perhaps the most to gain from PermStrucCoop. The beauty of 
                                                
23 Gerrard Quille, Joanna Popielawska and Jan Michael Deuter, Workshop Summary. The Impact of the Lisbon 
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24 Jo Coelmont, “Europe’s Military Ambition”. In: Biscop and Algieri, op.cit., pp. 5-10.  17 
 
PermStrucCoop or an analogous mechanism is its flexibility: allowing for both national and 
multinational – pooled – contributions, it does not oblige any Member State to go further in 
integration than it desires. The only vital precondition is that all participating Member States, 
and notably  the “big  three”,  empower  the  EDA  so that  the  process has a real chance  of 
success.  
 
PermStrucCoop is not an  end in itself,  but a means towards generating more deployable 
forces – which itself is only a means towards deploying Europe’s forces in the service of 
global peace and security. Ultimately therefore, even if the capabilities are available, political 
willingness, to commit troops where necessary and to act as EU, is the key. But the more 
integrated Europe’s military capabilities will be, the more EU Member States will be pushed 
to act as one.  
 
 